INTRODUCTION
More than a century ago, Marcus Alonzo Hanna, a politician who received political cash from businesses, made the following observation: "There are two things that are important in politics. The first is money and I can't remember what the second one is." 1 Hanna's observation remains true today. Elections are a money race that have become increasingly dependent on donors. 2 Money speaks in any facet of society, but in politics, it writes history.
The role of money in political campaigns has raised concerns of corruption and coordinated conduct between donors and candidates. 3 The government has responded to this concern with statutes and regulations. 4 Consequently, the United
I. A HISTORY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE LEGISLATION
Money in politics is deeply rooted in American history. It can be traced back to George Washington 10 and Andrew Jackson.
11
Washington bribed voters with booze, 12 and Jackson appointed his campaign supporters as federal officials. 13 The influence of money in political campaigns has drastically evolved since the era of Washington and Jackson, experiencing a series of restrictions to prevent corruption. 14 In the early 1900s, Congress passed several laws to restrict contributions from corporations and unions and to enhance the transparency of federal candidate expenditures. 15 Congress then passed the Federal Election Campaign Act in 1971 to limit individual contributions and improve disclosure of campaign donations. 16 Following the Watergate scandal, Congress further restricted campaign finance laws with the 1974 amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act. 17 The amendments imposed significant limits on individual contributions to federal candidates and enacted spending limits on federal elections.
18
These amendments also created the Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), an agency endowed with the chief responsibility of enforcing election laws. 19 Most recently, Congress passed the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, which restricts certain types of campaign spending and decreases limits for individual contributions to candidates. 20 Although the legislature continues to advocate for more restrictive campaign finance laws, the era of strict campaign financing law appears to be moving in a . 12 Bedard, supra note 10. 13 GERHARDT, supra note 11, at 54.
14 History of Campaign Finance Laws, supra note 4. 15 Id. 16 Id. 17 Id. 18 Id. 19 Id. 20 Id. 
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II. PACS, SUPER PACS AND HYBRID PACS
PACs and super PACs have become the primary vehicles for raising campaign money. These entities have recently morphed into a new form of campaign financing-the hybrid PAC. PACs collect money from individuals and then give contributions directly to a particular candidate or party. 22 The first PACs were established in the 1940s. 23 Since then, PACs have become increasingly important in elections, particularly because individuals can contribute more to PACs than they can contribute to a candidate or party. 24 Thus, PACs have created an avenue for individuals to contribute indirectly to campaigns and for candidates to receive campaign funding.
Super PACs became a popular form of campaign financing in 2010. 25 These committees are perhaps the greatest mechanism for raising money and campaigning on behalf of a candidate. 26 Super PACs are essentially PACs that can raise unlimited amounts of money and have no limit on independent expenditures. 27 The caveat is that, unlike PACs, super PACs cannot make contributions to a candidate 21 22 History of Campaign Finance Laws, supra note 4. 23 Id. 24 
Id.
25 Richard Briffault, Super PACs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644 (2012) . 26 See ELECTING THE PRESIDENT, 2012: THE INSIDERS' VIEW 146 (Kathleen Hall Jamieson ed., 2013) (explaining super PACs are allies to candidates and that a pro-Romney super PAC outspent the Romney campaign in 2012). 27 Briffault, supra note 25, at 1647. Independent expenditures are defined "as expenditures 'expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate' that are 'not made in concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candidate, the candidate's authorized political committee, or their agents, or a political party committee or its agents.'" SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2012) Hybrid PACs can "accept unlimited donations to finance independent expenditures and accept contributions, subject to the restrictions that ordinarily apply to contributions to PACs, to be used to make contributions to candidates." 34 Thus, a hybrid PAC will "operate as a [s]uper PAC with respect to its independent spending and as an ordinary PAC with respect to its contributions." 35 Currently, hybrid PACs are less common than PACs and super PACs, but they are creating great legal problems, including the legal dispute in Vermont Right to Life. 28 Peterman, supra note 27, at 1165. 29 Balz, supra note 2. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 
33 Byron Tau, Court: Super PAC Not Independent Enough, POLITICO (July 2, 2014, 5:10 PM), http:// www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/07/court-super-pac-not-independent-enough-191488 .html. 34 Briffault, supra note 25, at 1646-47 n.12. 35 Id. 
III. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PACS, SUPER PACS, AND HYBRID PACS

A. The Federal Election Campaign Act
As mentioned above, the genesis of contemporary campaign finance laws was the enactment of the Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") in 1971, followed by the 1974 amendments to FECA ("1974 Amendments"). The 1974 Amendments were passed in reaction to the Watergate scandal and a growing concern for the influence of money in politics. The Court's decision was predicated on finding that independent expenditure and contribution limits implicate fundamental First Amendment interests. 40 The Court struck down the 1974 Amendments' limits on independent expenditures but upheld the limits on contributions to candidates; the expenditure ceilings imposed more severe restrictions on the "protected freedoms of political expression and association" than did the limitations on financial contributions to candidates. 41 The Court reasoned that the expenditure limitations substantially restrained "the quantity and diversity of political speech," because the limitations would "exclude all citizens and groups . . . from any significant use of the most effective modes of communication. In reaching this decision, the Court identified the government's interest in restricting speech in campaign finance regulation. Specifically, it held that the state's interest in "limit[ing] the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions" justifies campaign finance regulations. 44 The Court was concerned about quid pro quo arrangements as a result of large contributions to candidates.
45
The Court also established a standard of judicial review for campaign finance laws. Equating political donations to free speech, it held that "significant interference" with financial contributions "may be sustained if the [s]tate demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms." 46 The Court held that the government's interest in preventing corruption justified the limits on contributions. 47 However, it held that this interest did not justify limits on independent expenditures, because expenditures do not pose a risk of quid pro quo corruption. 48 Thus, Buckley identified two competing interests in campaign finance regulations: (1) an individual's First Amendment guarantee of free speech and political expression; and (2) the government's concern for corruption and the appearance of corruption. 49 Buckley provided the legal foundation for super PACs. The decision created an incentive for PACs to spend money through independent expenditures instead of contributions. Ultimately, the Court provided the vehicle for unlimited spending and indirect campaign funding. 43 Id. at 20-21. 44 Id. at 26. 45 Id. The Court explained that actual quid pro quo corruption is the danger that "large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo"; however, the Court was concerned with the appearance of corruption "stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions." Id. at 26-27. 46 Id. at 25. 47 Id. at 25-30. 48 Id. at 45-46. 49 The 1976 Amendments eliminated the unconstitutional provision that limited independent expenditures, and it invoked a $5,000 limit on individual contributions to PACs.
51
In California Medical Association v. FEC, 52 a plurality of the Court upheld the $5,000 individual contribution ceiling to multicandidate PACs. 53 The plurality stressed that limiting the amount a contributor may give to a multicandidate PAC does not impair the contributor's rights. 54 The plurality was concerned that without a limitation, contributors would evade "the $1,000 limit on contribution to candidates . . . by channeling funds through a multicandidate political committee." 55 Justice Blackmun gave the necessary fifth vote in this decision.
56
In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed with the plurality that contributions to multicandidate political committees could be limited to $5,000 a year to prevent evasion of the limit on contributions to a candidate. 
61
The case involved a campaign ordinance that limited expenditures and contributions in campaigns involving both candidates and ballot measures.
62
The Court invalidated the ordinance by distinguishing between contributions to candidates and contributions to committees that advocate for or against ballot measures.
63
The Court held that contributions to these committees implicated the First Amendment interests of political expression and association more significantly than did contributions to candidates and, thus, held that there was no anticorruption justification for restraining these interests.
64
These decisions are significant because they stand for the proposition that, unlike contributions to candidates, donations to independent expenditure committees do not pose the threat of actual or potential corruption. 65 However, in these decisions the Court failed to define actual or potential corruption.
D. Defining "Corruption"
1. The Supreme Court Broadly Defines "Corruption"
In Buckley, the Court discussed "corruption" in terms of quid pro quo arrangements that result from large contributions to candidates. Thus, the Court broadly defined "corruption" when it held that this opportunity to "purchase . . . such influence" was "substantial evidence to support Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to national political parties [gave] rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption." 73 2. Circuit Courts Narrowly Define "Corruption"
The cases that followed McConnell continued to broaden the Court's understanding of "corruption," particularly in regard to independent expenditures. 71 See id. at 124-26; Briffault, supra note 25, at 1654. 72 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 145-50, 153-54; Briffault, supra note 25, at 1655. 73 McConnell, 540 U.S. at 154; Briffault, supra note 25, at 1655. 74 See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884-87 (2009) (holding that independent expenditures could create an "unconstitutional probability of bias" where the spender's donations and independent spending had a "disproportionate influence on the electoral outcome" and, thus, holding that a judge elected after receiving of three-million dollars of independent spending was required recuse himself from a case involving the spender); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659-60 (1990) (upholding state restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations because the state articulated a sufficient anticorruption interest, specifically preventing the corporations from using the This created "two strands in Supreme Court doctrine" as to whether contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees gave rise to a risk of corruption and whether these contributions could be limited. In arriving at its decision, the court discussed Justice Blackmun's concurrence in California Medical Association and reiterated that contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees do not pose the same threat of actual or potential corruption as PACs. 79 However, as with Justice Blackmun, the court did not rule that all limitations on contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees are unconstitutional. 80 Instead, it concluded that the state is subject to a heavier burden of showing "convincing evidence of corruption" when imposing economic resources they amass in the market place to gain an unfair political advantage), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see also Briffault, supra note 25, at 1655-56. 75 Briffault, supra note 25, at 1656 ("[O]n the eve of Citizens United there were two strands in Supreme Court doctrine that pointed in different directions if restrictions on contributions to political committees that make only independent expenditures were ever challenged."). 76 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 360; Briffault, supra note 25, at 1660-61. Committee as an independent-expenditure-only committee or a super PAC; rather, the court referred to it as an independent expenditure political action committee. N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 344 F.3d at 421, 433. A super PAC is "often formally referred to as an 'independent expenditure committee' or an 'independent expenditure-only PAC.'" Briffault, supra note 25, at 1646-47. Therefore, "independentexpenditure-only committee," "independent expenditure political action committee" and "super PAC" are used interchangeably in this Note. The Fourth Circuit also distinguished independent-expenditure-only committees from political parties. Explaining that independent-expenditure-only committees are "further removed from . . . candidate [s] ," the court stated that political parties "'have special access to and relationships with' those who hold public office," and "have influence and power in the [l] egislature that vastly exceeds that of any interest group." 85 As in its prior decision, the court reiterated that it is "'implausible' that contributions to [independent-expenditure-only committees] are corrupting." 86 However, the court again applied a heavy burden of proof, requiring the state "to produce convincing evidence of corruption before upholding limits" on contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees. EMILY's List is a hybrid 527 non-profit committee because it engages in independent spending and makes contributions to specific candidates. 91 The court recognized that such hybrid committees could be required to make contributions to federal candidates and parties out of a hard-money account, which is "an account subject to source and amount limits."
92
The court also acknowledged that these entities may make independent expenditures "out of a soft-money or general treasury account that is not subject to source and amount limits." 93 Thus, the court recognized that a nonprofit committee may make both direct contributions to a political party or candidate and independent expenditures.
94
Distinguishing non-profits from political parties, 95 the court held that EMILY's List and similar hybrid committees are not subject to dollar and source limits for their independent expenditures so long as these expenditures were not contributions to a candidate or party.
96
In arriving at this decision, the court recognized that "the regulation of non-profits does not fit within the anti-corruption rationale, which constitutes the sole basis for regulating campaign contributions and expenditures." 93 Id. 94 Id. ("A non-profit that makes expenditures to support federal candidates does not suddenly forfeit its First Amendment rights when it decides also to make direct contributions to parties or candidates. Rather, it simply must ensure, to avoid circumvention of individual contribution limits by its donors, that its contributions to parties or candidates come from a hard-money account."). 95 Id. at 14 ("Unlike . . . political parties [,] . . . there is no record evidence that non-profit entities have sold access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large contributions. More fundamentally, non-profit groups do not have the same inherent relationship with federal candidates and officeholders that political parties do." (citation omitted)). 96 Id. ("[N] on-profit groups-like individual citizens-may spend unlimited amounts out of their softmoney accounts for election-related activities, such as advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter registration drives."); see Briffault, supra note 25, at 1660. 97 EMILY's List, 581 F.3d at 11. The court further noted that "mere donations to non-profit groups cannot corrupt candidates and officeholders." Id. (emphasis omitted). 98 Moreover, the court rejected "that large contributions to independent expenditure groups lead to preferential access for donors and undue influence over officeholders." 115 The court concluded that contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees "cannot corrupt or create the appearance of corruption" because Citizens United held that "independent expenditures do not corrupt or create the appearance of quid pro quo corruption." 116 Other circuit courts have followed SpeechNow.org's holding and employed its application of Citizens United.
117
On First Amendment grounds, the Ninth Circuit invalidated two city ordinances that limited contributions to independentexpenditure-only committees that specifically supported or opposed candidates. the Seventh Circuit relied on Citizens United to invalidate a state limit on individual contributions to independent expenditure only organizations.
121
The court rejected the state's argument "that large contributions to independentexpenditure groups create the appearance of corruption 'in more indirect ways'" and that "preventing the indirect appearance of corruption is enough to satisfy the intermediate standard of review." 122 The court concluded that as a result of Citizens United, "[a]s a categorical matter, independent expenditures 'do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption. '" 123 In 2013, the Second Circuit granted a preliminary injunction preventing the enforcement of New York State Election Law provisions that imposed an aggregate limit on an individual's contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees.
124
The Second Circuit provided no opinion on the ultimate outcome, but granted the injunction finding that the plaintiff had a substantial likelihood of success on the merits in light of Citizens United. 125 Moreover, in January of 2014, independent expenditures," and finding that the PACs challenging the city ordinance had an indirect relationship with municipal candidates and lacked "the historical interconnection with candidates that distinguishes political parties"); Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce v. City of Long Beach, 603 F.3d 684, 695 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 896 (2010) (declaring that "Supreme Court precedent forecloses the City's argument that independent expenditures by independent expenditure committees . . . raise the specter of corruption or the appearance thereof," and that "the City may not impose financial limits on the . . . PACs' independent expenditures"); Briffault, supra note 25, at 1663-64. 119 Thalheimer, 645 F.3d at 1119 (second italicization added) (quoting Long Beach Area Chamber of Commerce, 603 F.3d at 694 n.5). 120 664 F.3d 139 (7th Cir. 2011). 121 Id. at 153-54; Briffault, supra note 25, at 1664-65. 122 664 F.3d at 155 (internal citation omitted) (rejecting that state's suggestion that a proverbial "wink or nod" between a donor and candidate regarding the donor's contribution to an independent expenditure political committee is an indirect appearance of corruption); Briffault, supra note 25, at 1665. 
126
The court declared that, "because there is no corruption interest in limiting independent expenditures, there can also be no interest in limiting contributions to non-party entities that make independent expenditures." 127 The NMTA, which was one of the political committees at issue in the case, differed from the committees that had previously challenged campaign finance laws; the NMTA made both candidate contributions and independent expenditures.
128
The court rejected New Mexico's argument that this form of a political committee creates a government interest in limiting contributions to these entities and that Citizens United supports such restrictions.
129
In keeping with the six circuits above, the Fifth Circuit also followed Citizens United's holding that independent expenditures do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption when it invalidated provisions of the Texas Election Code. 130 The court found that Texas had no direct anticorruption justification for imposing a sixty-day waiting period on general-purpose, independent-expenditureonly committees.
131
IV. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF HYBRID PACS
A. Circuit Court Decisions
As discussed in Part II, hybrid PACs are committees that make both independent expenditures and direct contributions to candidates and political parties. Although hybrid PACs are a new form of a PAC, they have already been the focus of FEC advisory opinions and federal circuit court decisions. In 2010, the FEC issued an advisory opinion pertaining to Club for Growth, Inc. ("Club"), a 126 741 F.3d 1089, 1097 (10th Cir. 2013). 127 Id. at 1096-97. 128 Id. at 1097. 129 Id. at 1097-98 (finding that no anticorruption interest is furthered "as long as the NMTA maintains an account segregated from its candidate contributions"). 130 Catholic Leadership Coal. of Tex. v. Reisman, 764 F.3d 409, 428 (5th Cir. 2014) ("The Supreme Court has been unequivocal that, as a matter of law, independent expenditures do not give rise to corruption or the appearance of corruption."). 131 Id. at 432 ("We therefore conclude that the 60-day, 500-dollar limit is unconstitutional insofar as it limits a general-purpose committee, such as TLC-IPA, to funding only $500 in independent expenditures."). 
132
Relying on Citizens United, SpeechNow.org, and EMILY's List, the FEC determined that, despite the Club having a PAC, the Club could also establish an independent-expenditure-only committee that "may solicit and accept unlimited contributions from the general public even if the Club pays the [independent expenditure committee's] establishment, administrative [,] and solicitation expenses." 133 The FEC was not dissuaded by the fact that the treasurer of the Club's PAC would also serve as the treasurer of the Club's independent expenditure committee because the Club stated that the independent expenditure committee "[would] not engage in coordinated activity and [would] comply with the requirements" of the Federal Code pertaining to coordinated conduct and independent expenditures. 
135
Carey involved the National Defense Political Action Committee ("NDPAC"), an organization that wanted to "make both independent expenditures for federal campaigns with soft money and direct contributions to federal candidates and political parties with hard money." 136 The court held that the NDPAC could solicit and spend unlimited funds for independent expenditures, as well as make contributions to candidates. 137 The court rejected the FEC's attempt to require the NDPAC to establish a second formal committee, declaring that "nonconnected non-profits are not the same as political parties and do not cause the same concerns of quid pro quo money-for-access." 138 Likening the NDPAC to EMILY's List, the court concluded that maintaining separate accounts for direct contributions (a hard money account) and for independent expenditures (a soft 
141
Like the political committee in Carey, one of the political committees challenging the New Mexico law made both independent expenditures and contributions to candidates 142 and, thus, was a hybrid PAC. The court discussed whether the political committee's structure was permissible. 143 The Tenth Circuit concluded it was valid, finding the political committee complied with EMILY's List, as it had separate bank accounts for independent expenditures and contributions to candidates. The difference between the two entities is that the VRLC is a Vermont non-profit corporation and the VRLC-FIPE is a registered political committee created by VRLC under Vermont campaign finance statutes.
148
The VRLC also formed the Vermont Right to Life Committee, Inc. Political Committee ("VRLC-PC"), which 139 Id. at 131-32 (approving the NDPAC's proposal of establishing separate bank accounts for hard money and soft money because this would fully comply with EMILY's List and be a narrowly tailored means to achieve a compelling interest); Briffault, supra note 25, at 1667-68. 140 and, therefore, is a PAC. Among the issues on appeal was the VRLC-FIPE's constitutional challenge to Vermont's limit on contributions to PACs.
150
The VRLC-FIPE contended that the law violated the First Amendment as applied to the VRLC-FIPE because it is an independent-expenditure-only group, that is, a super PAC, and does not make contributions to political campaigns. 151 In support of this position, the VRLC-FIPE asserted that the VRLC's resolution that created the VRLC-FIPE "provide [ In part of its decision, the Second Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's emphasis that independent expenditures have an "absence of prearrangement and coordination" to find that the VRLC-FIPE is not an independent-expenditure-only committee. Rather, the court found that "[a] separate bank account may be relevant," but it does not sufficiently prevent "prearrangement" and "coordinated expenditures." 159 Moreover, the court declined to follow the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in North Carolina Right to Life, where the Fourth Circuit held that the NCRL-FIPE (an organization similar to the VRLC-FIPE) was independent from its sister organization, the NCRL-PC (an entity akin to the VRLC-PC), because the NCRL-FIPE maintained organizational documents stating that the group was independent as a matter of law.
160
Although the VRLC had similar documents pertaining to the VRLC-FIPE, 161 the Second Circuit concluded that "organizational documents alone [do not] satisfy the anticorruption concern with coordinated expenditures that may justify contribution limits." 162 "Some actual organizational separation between the groups must exist to assure that the expenditures are in fact uncoordinated." 163 Thus, according to the Second Circuit, separate bank accounts and organizational documents are not sufficient to ensure that funds and information will only be used for independent expenditures. 164 The Second Circuit suggested that determining whether two entities are separate is a fact-specific inquiry. 165 It delineated several factors for consideration, including "overlap of staff and resources, the lack of financial independence, the coordination of activities, and the flow of information between the entities." 166 The court found that the "VRLC-FIPE is functionally indistinguishable from [the] 158 Id. 159 Id. 160 Id. (citing N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 294 n.8 (4th Cir. 2008)). The Fourth Circuit rejected North Carolina's argument that the NCRL-FIPE was "not actually an independent expenditure committee because it [was] closely intertwined" with the NCRL. Id. Its decision was predicated on the NCRL-FIPE organization documents. Id. 161 Id. at 122 (noting that the VRLC's resolution that created the VRLC-FIPE "provide [d] that [the VRLC-FIPE] may not make monetary or in-kind contributions to candidates, or coordinate the content, timing or distribution of its communications or other activities with candidates or their campaigns." (internal quotations omitted)). 162 Id. at 141-42. 163 Id. at 141. 164 Id. 165 Id. at 142. 166 Id. VRLC-PC" due to the "total overlap of staff and resources, the fluidity of funds, and the lack of any informational barrier between the entities." 167 Therefore, the court concluded that the contribution limits that apply to the VRLC-PC also apply to the VRLC-FIPE.
168
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Since Vermont Right to Life, no circuit court has been presented with the issue of whether the super PAC and the sister PAC of a hybrid PAC are independent and distinct. 169 As previously discussed, campaign finance laws are rooted in two conflicting interests: (1) the government's corruption concern; and (2) the First Amendment's right of free speech.
170
The Supreme Court and circuit courts have consistently held that the anticorruption interests established thus far are insufficient to permit limitations on super PACs or limits on contributions to these committees.
171
With a circuit split on the issue and no legal discussion or application of Vermont Right to Life, there is uncertainty as to whether free speech preempts these limitations in the case of hybrid PACs. Furthermore, there is no guidance for hybrid PACs in the 2016 presidential election. Given that money plays an essential role in a candidate's ability to win office, politically active organizations and committees must be properly structured in order to avoid any impediment to independently supporting candidates and parties in the upcoming election.
Hybrid PACs subject to the jurisdiction of circuits that have not decided this issue should be aware of Vermont Right to Life; they should not, however, strictly yield to the Second Circuit's opinion. While the Second Circuit raised relevant concerns, its standard is flawed. This standard arguably prohibits forming an effective hybrid PAC. Consequently, it severely restricts free speech, particularly for hybrid PACs such as the VRLC that advocate policy and do not operate solely 167 Id. at 145. 168 Id. 169 The VRLC and the VRLC-FIPE petitioned for a writ of certiorari, but it was denied. Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 135 S. Ct. 949 (2015). 170 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 24-25, 26-27 (1976) (per curiam). 171 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359-61 (2010) (explaining that the only interest that is sufficient to limit contributions is preventing "quid pro quo corruption" and, thus, rejecting limits on independent expenditures). to elect candidates. Additionally, the Second Circuit's holding is predicated on an anticorruption theory that the Court has rejected for super PACs.
172
A. Determining Independence
Citizens United held that independent expenditures cannot give rise to the risk of quid pro quo corruption, and that only this type of corruption warrants a limitation on expenditures and contributions to a super PAC. 173 Hybrid PACs complicate this determination by raising the issue of whether an organization that has both a PAC and super PAC could give rise to the risk of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance of corruption. Courts have consistently held that no such danger exists if the entities are independent, and these courts have imposed various tests for determining independence.
174
The Second Circuit demands a higher standard for determining independence than other circuits.
175
Most courts determine independence if two entities have separate bank accounts.
176
Another adopted approach is whether the entities have organizational documents stating that the independent-expenditure-only committee is independent as a matter of law.
177
The Second Circuit requires actual organizational separation between the committees and holds that separate bank accounts and organizational documents are not sufficient. 176 Republican Party of N.M., 741 F.3d at 1097 (finding the hybrid political committee was permissible because it complied with EMILY's List, having separate bank accounts for independent expenditures and contributions to candidates); EMILY's List, 581 F.3d at 12 (discussing that a hybrid organization is permissible if it maintains a hard money account that is subject to source and amount limits and maintains a soft money account, that is not subject to source and amount limits); Carey, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 131-32 (concluding that maintaining separate accounts for direct contributions and for independent expenditures satisfies federal law and is a narrowly tailored means of ensuring no overlap between hard and soft money). 177 See N.C. Right to Life, Inc., 525 F.3d at 294 n.8 (rejecting North Carolina's argument that the "NCRL-FIPE is not actually an independent expenditure committee because it is 'closely intertwined' with [the] NCRL and [the] NCRL-PAC," and finding that, although the NCRL-FIPE has staff and facility overlap with its sister and parent entities, it is independent as a matter of law). 178 Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc., 758 F.3d at 142. 
179
The Second Circuit was not necessarily incorrect in demanding a certain level of distinction between the PAC and super PAC of a hybrid PAC; failure to maintain separateness creates difficulty in regulating the two entities and could increase the likelihood that their funds will be improperly used. 180 Therefore, organizational documents stating that an independent-expenditure-only committee is independent as a matter of law is too lenient of a standard; it offers no regulation or division of PAC and super PAC money.
181
The appearance of corruption and coordination can quickly become a reality when there is no precise division of money. However, requiring separate bank accounts achieves a proper balance between free speech and an anticorruption interest; it imposes minimal restrictions on political communication and prevents money donated to the super PAC from being contributed to a candidate's campaign.
182
The Second Circuit's method is flawed because it severely restricts free speech, especially in regard to the VRLC. Contrary to public belief, not all PACs, including super PACs and hybrid PACs, solely exist and operate to elect candidates.
183
The VRLC is policy-oriented and does not seek to elect a particular 179 Id. at 142. 180 See id. at 141 (emphasizing a concern for prearrangement and spending funds in coordination with candidates, specifically in regard to assuring that expenditures are uncoordinated). 181 Id. at 141-42. Policy-oriented committees like the VRLC must engage in multiple forms of advocacy to communicate effectively and lobby their policies.
185
Successfully and efficiently achieving this requires organizational and staff overlap.
186
By rejecting organizational enmeshment and staff sharing, the court is requiring that two separate, formal entities be formed. This effectively bans hybrid PACs. These organizations need overlap for communication and support in order to reap the benefits of structuring in this mixed-entity form; to require otherwise renders them obsolete. In fact, hybrid PACs that have been upheld have organizational and staff overlap, particularly with high-level employees.
187
By making it essentially impossible to form an effective hybrid PAC, the Second Circuit has restricted any successful form of political communication for these entities and thereby has restricted free speech. This is contrary to Supreme Court precedent. In Citizens United, Justice Kennedy emphasized that any congressional remedy to independent expenditures influencing candidates must comply with the tradition of the law that favors more speech, not less.
188
The Second Circuit fails to uphold this tradition by imposing a standard that essentially prohibits effective organization and communication of hybrid PACs. In attempting to prevent coordinated conduct, the Second Circuit has, in fact, prevented free speech in the absence of evidence of prearrangement and corruption.
B. The Anticorruption Interest for Hybrid PACs
Courts require some separation between the super PAC and PAC of a hybrid PAC to reduce the risks of corruption and coordination that are associated with 184 See About Us, VT. RIGHT TO LIFE COMMITTEE, http://www.vrlc.net/about/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (explaining that VRLC's mission "is to achieve universal recognition of the sanctity of human life from conception through natural death" and its purpose is seeking "changes in public opinion, public policy, [and] the law" with respect to any action that denies the right to life). 185 See Backer, supra note 183 (explaining that policy-oriented PACs are an integral part of that threelegged stool utilized by sophisticated advocates, which includes professional advocacy, grassroots and grasstops advocacy, and money). 186 See id. ("Hybrid PACs offer the best of both worlds: Hard dollars to advance specific policy initiatives the way 'traditional,' pre-Carey PACs have long done, and soft dollars to underwrite operations, hire advocacy-oriented staff, and support grassroots and grasstops advocacy-the other legs of the three-legged stool."). 187 See Op. 2010-09, supra note 132, at 4-5 (noting that the Club has a PAC, and the president of the Club, who serves as the Club PAC's treasurer, will also serve as the treasurer of the Club's independent expenditure committee); Briffault, supra note 25, at 1666. In this sense, the Second Circuit raised relevant concerns in assuring that expenditures are, in fact, uncoordinated with a candidate and that a hybrid PAC's independent expenditure money is not used for contributions to candidates or political parties.
191
Unlike a super PAC, which is purely an independentexpenditure-only committee, hybrid PACs directly contribute to candidates' campaigns and make independent expenditures. Consequently, an increased concern for corruption, or "prearrangement and coordination," logically arises where a super PAC and PAC are within the same organization.
While the Second Circuit raised a relevant concern, it failed to identify a state interest that has been recognized by the Supreme Court when limiting contributions to independent-expenditure-only committees, such as the VRLC-FIPE. The Second Circuit claimed that its decision was justified as preventing coordinated expenditures, where "funds are spent in coordination with [a particular] candidate." 192 However, the Supreme Court has declared there is no concern of prearrangement or coordination in the context of independent expenditures.
193
It has only recognized that preventing "quid pro quo corruption" or the appearance thereof justifies limitations on free speech. 196 The Second Circuit held that preventing prearrangement and coordination is a valid anticorruption interest because the independent-expenditure-only committee, the VRLC-FIPE, was indistinguishable from the VRLC-PC, the non-independentexpenditure-only committee. 197 Buckley provides that this is a valid anticorruption interest in limiting contributions to PACs. 198 Thus, the Second Circuit's decision would not have created any conflict among the circuits if the VRLC-FIPE was, in fact, indistinguishable from the VRLC-PC. However, as discussed above, the Second Circuit's standard for determining whether the PAC and super PAC of a hybrid PAC are independent and distinct was flawed.
C. Proposed Solution
While preventing prearrangement and coordination has not been specifically articulated by the Supreme Court or recognized by other circuits, Buckley suggests that it is a valid anticorruption interest. 199 Thus, the test for determining independence should be tailored to this anticorruption interest. As delineated by the D.C. and Tenth Circuits, a hybrid PAC must have separate bank accounts for hard money that is associated with its PAC and for soft money that is used for independent expenditures.
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The sole anticorruption concern is whether money contributed to an independent expenditure committee is used to pay for campaigning that is coordinated with a particular candidate, 201 and the standard 202 Additionally, with disclosure requirements still applying to the independent expenditure committee, any concerns of coordinated conduct and political favors for large donors can be flagged. In the absence of any true enmeshment of funds and spending, the corruption interest is insufficient to restrict free speech and political communication in this manner. 203 Although the Second Circuit demands an information barrier and separate staff, 204 these are not needed to ensure against prearrangement and coordinated conduct. 205 Amount limitations are imposed on PACs because they directly contribute to a candidate or party, which gives rise to concerns of actual of quid pro quo corruption and the appearance of corruption. 206 However, actual corruption does not necessarily exist; the mere appearance of corruption is sufficient to limit contributions to PACs. 207 The independent-expenditure-only part of a hybrid PAC is further removed from the candidate and political party than is the PAC; therefore, it is also further removed from potential quid pro quo corruption and the risk of prearrangement and coordination. 208 Consequently, the risk of a super PAC engaging in coordinated conduct when it shares certain staff and information with a PAC is insufficient to restrict free speech. 209 This is particularly so because sharing some staff and information makes a hybrid PAC effective.
Requiring separate bank accounts is the solution. It achieves the proper balance between free speech and concerns of prearrangement and coordination. Furthermore, circuit court precedent supports it-the D.C. and Tenth Circuits have adopted this approach, and the Fourth Circuit has adopted a less demanding approach. 211 Finally, this approach upholds the values articulated by the Supreme Court, which emphasize that any attempt to remedy corruption concerns of independent expenditure committees must comply with the tradition of the law that favors more speech, not less.
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D. Implications for the 2016 Election
For the 2016 presidential election, hybrid PACs should strictly follow the separate account requirement, as well as disclose contributions and expenses. So long as the FEC has knowledge of where the funds are going, there is little concern of corruption, at least none sufficient to impose limits on contributions. Failure to abide by this requirement could affect a hybrid PAC's influence on the election. If hybrid PACs cannot benefit from the limitless contribution and spending amounts of independent-expenditure-only committees, these entities will have to depend on greater participation from individuals to make contributions. The super PAC part of hybrid PACs will no longer be able to depend on large contributions from a small group of wealthy donors, restricting funding and spending. Maintaining separate bank accounts will allow hybrid PACs to fully utilize their resources and maximize influence in elections and, more significantly, they will be able to effectively advocate policy.
CONCLUSION
While courts have consistently held that super PACs cannot give rise to the risk of corruption, they have yet to articulate a corruption interest when either a super PAC or PAC restructures as a hybrid PAC. 213 In addressing the corruption concerns of hybrid PACs, states' solutions should realize the tradition of law that favors free speech and the need for some staff overlap and no information barriers. States should be particularly lenient in their analysis if the hybrid PAC is policy- 211 212 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 361 (emphasizing that any congressional remedy to address independent expenditures influencing candidates must comply with the tradition of the law that favors more speech, not less). 213 See id. at 357. oriented, as opposed to candidate-specific. Thus, states should require separate bank accounts for soft and hard money to prevent any coordinated conduct and corruption, while still maintaining free speech.
U N I V E R S I T Y O F P I T T S B U R G H L
In a time where politics have become increasingly bipartisan, one's political voice is more important than ever. The ability to advocate for policies and candidates with limited restrictions is central to our democracy. This right should not be limited or forfeited when a super PAC or PAC restructures into perhaps the most effective vehicle for political advocacy-the hybrid PAC. 
